Inquiries & Recommendations

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Examine runway visual indications with the objective of providing additional visual reminders to pilots that a displaced threshold is in operation.

He publish flight safety advice to pilots explaining: • How features such as valleys, VFR lanes or edges of controlled airspace constrain aircraft onto similar courses and concentrate traffic density; • How similar performance aircraft may converge laterally or vertically where lookout is most difficult; • What steps to take to compensate for this difficulty; • That an essential part of visual collision avoidance is a low traffic density. Good airmanship includes consideration of when and where to fly, with this in mind.

Implements a track inspection regime of a standard and to a frequency that: • identifies and protects predictable weak spots • detects repeated non-standard practices and that the inspection requirements are formalised and adhered to.

Evaluate the hull and directional control characteristics of the Fiordland Navigator and, where appropriate, adopt for that ship the remedial actions for the Milford Sovereign.

Promote the early introduction of terrain awareness and warning systems for Part 135 aircraft, current and new, flown under single-pilot IFR in accordance with the criteria to be proscribed by the proposed new Rules.

Develop a procedure to ensure that the 5-knot rule is promoted and enforced, particularly during future special maritime events.

Require that proposed new procedures, or changes to procedures, be reviewed and incorporated in the Manual of Air Traffic Services prior to implementation.

The Monte Stello was fitted with a voyage data recorder (VDR), but it had not been maintained in working order because New Zealand Maritime Rules do not require one to be fitted. Even New Zealand-registered ships to which SOLAS has been applied are currently not required to be fitted with a VDR because New Zealand Maritime Rules have not been updated to incorporate changes made to SOLAS that came into effect in July 2002.

Vessels' machinery installations and their control systems are complex, and regardless of how well maintained they are there will always remain the possibility that some part fails for some reason. For a vessel like the Hanjin Bombay that has only one propulsion system, the risk of losing control of the vessel caused by a single-point failure is higher than that for other vessels that have greater levels of redundancy built in to their propulsion and power-management systems. These types of vessel rely heavily on tug services when operating in confined pilotage waters.

Adapt the appropriate rules to require any rigid inflatable to: Be able to withstand the deflation of any one of its inflatable pontoons and still meet the existing stability criteria. Have explicit instruction manuals and guidelines for maintenance, which must be sighted by the surveyor before a Certificate of Survey is issued. Have each pontoon numbered for identification and its method of securing recorded on the Certificate of Survey if the inflatable pontoons are interchangeable.

Review the operation of the aircraft technical log to ensure critical information is duplicated and held separately from the log, possibly with the aircraft’s maintenance documents.

institue abnormal procedures contingency plan training on board to familiarise the master, officers and crew with the operational procedures to be undertaken in any such emergency.