Inquiries & Recommendations

Ngā ketuketutanga me ngā tūtohunga

At about 2218 on Friday, 23 February 2001, northbound Train 144 struck a derailed wagon while passing southbound Train 237 between Pukekohe and Paerata on the North Island Main Trunk line. The incident occurred when a PK wagon conveying containers on Train 237 became derailed at Paerata as a result of a wheel bearing failure. The LE of Train 237 had seen sparks coming from the middle of his train and suspected a possible dragging brake rod. He was unaware of the derailment and proceeded slowly from Paerata towards Pukekohe where he intended to stop and inspect his train.

At about 0750 on 13 February 2001, the crew were performing a lifeboat launching drill shortly after the vessel "Nicolai Maersk" arrived in Auckland. While attempting to return the port lifeboat from the boat deck level to its stow position, the davit winch motor repeatedly tripped on overload. In order to stow the lifeboat, the davit arms were raised by manually closing the contactor located in the lifeboat winch starter box one deck below, to operate the winch motor. Manual closing of the contactor had the effect of bypassing the safety stop limit switches.

On Monday 12 February 2001, at about 1115, jet boat "Shotover 6" was proceeding down Shotover River at about 75 km/h with the driver and 10 passengers on board, when the engine suddenly stopped. As a result the driver lost steerage of the boat and it continued for about another 50 m before colliding with rocks and overhanging trees on the riverbank. One passenger suffered moderate injuries and the driver and other passengers suffered minor bruising. The boat was slightly damaged. The exact cause of the engine failure was not established. Safety issues identified included:

On Thursday 25 January 2001 at about 0945, the commercial jet boat "Huka Jet 3", with a driver and 10 passengers on board, was proceeding at about 60 km/h into the area known as the "Second Tunnel" on Lake Aratiatia on the Waikato River near Taupo, when the extreme right rear of the boat struck a rock on the riverbank. The impact slewed the boat to the right and despite the driver’s efforts to regain control, the boat climbed the riverbank and came to rest among the trees within the tunnel area. Four of the passengers were severely injured and 4 others received minor injuries.

At about 1055 on Monday 8 January 2001, a collision occurred at Makikihi Beach Road level crossing between passenger express Train 901 Southerner and a loaded stock truck and trailer unit. The truck had cleared the level crossing but the trailer was only halfway across when the train collided with it and derailed. Two of the train crew and 3 passengers were seriously injured and 24 passengers suffered minor injuries as a result of the collision. A factor contributing to the collision was the failure of the truck driver to give way to Train 901.

At about 1150 on Thursday 28 December 2000, a diesel multiple unit Train 3134 collided head on with another diesel multiple unit Train 3130 on the up main line between Penrose and Ellerslie. Train 3130 had become disabled at Ellerslie and with the assistance of a relief diesel multiple unit was setting back to Penrose in a wrong line running movement on the up main line.

On Tuesday 19 December 2000, at about 1700, Piper PA28-140 ZK-CIK departed from Forest Field aerodrome near Christchurch on a return scenic flight. On board the aeroplane were the pilot and 2 passengers. After circling several properties near Waiau in North Canterbury, the aeroplane was last seen at about 1745 heading in the direction of Hanmer Springs. At about 2100 the aeroplane was reported overdue to Police.

On Thursday 14 December 2000, at 1804, Piper PA23-250D Aztec ZK-DIR landed at Gisborne Aerodrome. Shortly after landing its nose undercarriage leg collapsed aft. The pilot and 4 passengers on board the aircraft were uninjured. Nothing conclusive was found showing why the undercarriage leg collapsed. Three scenarios are discussed as possible causes. The more likely possible cause was that play in the drag strut bushes somehow contributed to a mechanical down lock malfunction, but this could not be replicated during testing. No safety issues were identified.

[A preliminary investigation showed that the circumstances were not likely to have significant implications for transport safety. Consistent with section 13 of the TAIC Act the Commission discontinued the investigation and no report was published.]

This report examines 6 track heat buckle incidents that occurred in different localities throughout New Zealand in the summer of 2000/2001, 5 of which resulted in derailments. Safety issues identified by these incidents included: • the need for training of track staff to ensure they recognise and respond to visible track defects • the possible need to protect continuous welded rail, formed at an unknown neutral temperature, during hot weather • the need to control tamping and lining to ensure track is not realigned leaving increased compressive stress in the rails

At about 0400 on Friday 8 December 2000, Train 828, a northbound express freight train, passed Signal 212 at Middleton at "Stop" and collided head-on with departing southbound express freight Train 951. Three locomotive crew members received minor injuries. The locomotive on each train and a number of wagons were extensively damaged. Safety issues identified included the control of locomotive engineers hours of duty, fatigue management and the ability of the locomotive vigilance system to overcome short-term attention deficits in time to prevent this type of collision.

This report examines 6 track heat buckle incidents that occurred in different localities throughout New Zealand in the summer of 2000/2001, 5 of which resulted in derailments. Safety issues identified by these incidents included: • the need for training of track staff to ensure they recognise and respond to visible track defects • the possible need to protect continuous welded rail, formed at an unknown neutral temperature, during hot weather • the need to control tamping and lining to ensure track is not realigned leaving increased compressive stress in the rails