Inquiries & Recommendations

Ngā ketuketutanga me ngā tūtohunga

Reviews the format of the train control diagram to provide improved kilometrage information on the vertical scale.

Conduct a risk assessment of navigation in confined waters, and upgrade the passage plans to make use of techniques such as monitored turns and critical decision points, and foster the use of good bridge resource management to implement and monitor the passage plans

Give priority to completing workplace operating plans for both NZRL and the Port of Wellington Ltd covering the operational restraints necessary to ensure controlled integrated operation of both companies on Port of Wellington Ltd property, and that such plans are reviewed, updated and compliance checked to continually maintain a safe operational and work environment.

Publish another article on wing-tip vortices, in the Vector magazine, to alert pilots and operators to wake turbulence concerns. This article should highlight the dangers of encountering wake turbulence and explain how it can be avoided.

publicise the findings of this report in boating magazines and journals in New Zealand, to warn owners and operators of the possible dangers of attaching additional items to critical control cables.

A programme be developed to review the adequacy of all warnings to motorists at intersections on State Highways which have railway crossings in close proximity.

Modify the engine room alarm indicating system to ensure the watchkeeper can detect an alarm from anywhere in the engine room

Make available to each qualified helicopter pilot a copy of the article on uncommanded yaw published in Flight Safety in 1985.

ensure that his Safe Ship Mangement surveyors ensure that the minimum manning and operating limits, of all client vessels are clearly notified in the Safe Ship Management documentation.

In order to reduce confusion and the possibility of misinterpretation, develop a policy to rationalise and simplify the current maritime rules concerning the crewing and watchkeeping requirements for non-SOLAS vessels, and the limits in which they operate.

Critical components in a fixed CO2 gas fire fighting system such as control valves can cause serious harm or immobilise a vessel if they fail. It is a concern that such components are only required to be internally examined every 5 years and are not required to be tested at the design operating pressure at all.

The company require restraining of at least the left propeller on SAAB 340 aircraft at all times during turnaround.