Inquiries & Recommendations

Ngā ketuketutanga me ngā tūtohunga

Take action to address the safety issues discussed in the recommendations of the specialist independent aeronautical engineer's review of the STC process, listed below: The CAA should make the introduction of a redesigned fin for all FU24's a very high priority.

Liaise with Transit New Zealand to review the integrated use of Barters Road and Kirk Road level crossings and take such steps as are necessary to encourage long vehicles to use Barters Road level crossing and to prohibit any uncontrolled crossing of Kirk Road level crossing by vehicles exceeding 11 m in length.

Restrict passenger access to vans while the train is stationery at the platform unless under Tranz Rail staff supervision, and ensure all doors are clear of passengers and closed prior to giving right of way to the driver.

Ensure that training sufficiently equips the crew to properly follow the emergency response plans contained in the safe ship management manuals.

Investigate the practicability of using the radio altimeter to give back-up warning during non-precision instrument approaches.

Institute independent inspections of the Airways Corporation's operations where in the opinion of one of the pilots a collision was likely to have occurred if avoiding action has not been taken, irrespective of the cause attributed by the Airways Corporation.

They consider having the validity of the suggested changes to the seat design evaluated.

Ensure that before the Airways Corporation agrees to provide Air Traffic Control at any air show a realistic evaluation of the workload on the ATS Controllers is conducted and the appropriate arrangements made to ensure no individual controller will be overloaded.

Immediately advise all New Zealand Partenavia P68 operators about the potential for inadvertent tank-to-tank fuel transfer; and to ensure ease of movement of the cockpit fuel selector knobs. On receipt of the pending Vulcanair P68 service bulletin require operators to implement the actions recommended, to obtain the necessary synchronisation between the cockpit fuel selector knobs and wing fuel selector valves.

develop training procedures to strengthen the focus to Mis 60 and wrong line running procedures.

The current track and mechanical code standards and maintenance tolerances are not compatible and there remains a high risk of derailments caused by dynamic interaction.

Review the adequacy of existing Codes and procedures and amend as necessary to ensure they include unambiguous guidelines as to: • When, how, and where to measure rail temperatures. • A check list of conditions which identify clearly track which may be prone to buckling. • How to interpret the results of rail temperature measurements, and apply them to the immediate actions to be taken in respect of track which may be prone to buckling in order to ensure train safety when critical conditions are identified. • The follow-up actions to be taken to ensure on-going safety.