Inquiries & Recommendations

Ngā ketuketutanga me ngā tūtohunga

He redraft paragraph 3.3.1 on page MET 3-2 of the Aeronautical Information Publication to clarify whether or not the General Aviation Weather is intended for use by pilots planning VFR air transport operations.

Ensuring the completeness of a train following a train parting or similar event is a safety-critical procedure for protecting against wagons being inadvertently left behind and creating the potential for a high speed collision in track warrant territory. The Commission believes that the circumstances where the procedure for ensuring the completeness of the train was so easily by-passed on this occasion is a safety issue. The Commission recommends that the New Zealand Transport Agency addresses that safety issue.

Implement the requirements of Maritime Rule Part 31C [Crewing and Watchkeeping - Fishing Vessels] Section 4 [Watchkeeping] for all vessels under the SGS M&I Safe Ship Management system. [This safety recommendation was subsequently found to be equally applicable to two other occurrences. Refer to reports 04-207 (grounding of fishing vessel "Poseidon" on 15 April 2004) and 04-209 (collision of fishing vessel "Joanne" with motor tanker "Hellas Constellation" on 19 May 2004).]

require all operators of the Piper PA 23-250 Aztec aeroplanes that are subject to AD DCA/PA-23/155A, to replace the gear selector lever with the new improved version, part number 761213, as soon as practicable.

On 30 July 2015 the Commission recommends to the Chief Executive of the NZ Transport Agency that from a regulatory perspective he take the necessary steps to ensure that the relevant Safety Case(s) and resultant safety system(s) (including any lease or access agreements made under those systems) expressly articulate which party or parties is responsible for controlling and protecting pedestrians as they cross the boundaries between railway stations and the rail corridor.

The present severe weather warning system described by Rail Operating Rules and Procedures Section 1, Rule 6(b) does not require feedback from area managers to the network control manager on receipt of severe weather alerts, which creates an open loop information flow and prevents the network control manager from maintaining an overview of severe weather actions being taken across the entire network. Network control managers spoken to did not see maintaining an overview of actions during severe weather as their responsibility.

Consider the need to advise any B767 operator who has main undercarriage assembled in service that have been involved in runway excursions onto unprepared surfaces to dismantle such assembled and test them for evidence of corrosion and/or cracking.

Ensure that Council’s planning and consent procedures for future applications involving side roads and exits from private rights-of-way joining public roads in the immediate vicinity of railway level crossings include a requirement for the provision of adequate protection.

Change company policy to require clients to inform it of matters potentially affecting the status of safe ship management certificates, as prescribed in Rule Part 21 [Safe Ship Management] [original text referred to Part 20 in error].

Review the limiting dimensions of ships allowed to use the port to better reflect the PIANC guidelines.

Disused vector 01/19 on the Club's private strip at Mt Tarawera airstrip be marked with a white cross at each end to deter any pilot from attempting a landing on it.

Requires non-precision approaches at Queenstown to be re-evaluated to determine whether any rule exemptions or procedural requirements are necessary to enable safe circling manoeuvres.