The present severe weather warning system described by Rail Operating Rules and Procedures Section 1, Rule 6(b) does not require feedback from area managers to the network control manager on receipt of severe weather alerts, which creates an open loop information flow and prevents the network control manager from maintaining an overview of severe weather actions being taken across the entire network. Network control managers spoken to did not see maintaining an overview of actions during severe weather as their responsibility. In this case the network control manager did not monitor the severe weather alerts as they were being updated by MetService, with the result that neither the area manager nor his staff nor the locomotive engineers of trains in that area were aware of the current severe weather alert. Current contact details for recipients of severe weather warnings from network control were also allowed to lapse.
The Commission recommends that the New Zealand Transport Agency oversee a review of KiwiRail’s severe weather warning system and underlying processes for effective communication of warnings to ensure that it results in an appropriate level of awareness, actions and responses to severe weather events across the entire rail system.
