Match your navigation techniques to the conditions; this is the key point in the Transport Accident Investigation Commission’s final report on the grounding of a pilot vessel in restricted visibility conditions near Bluff in December 2024.
The accident happened on 26 December 2024, when the pilot vessel Takitimu II was heading out to an inbound ship from South Port. On board were the vessel’s master, a deckhand and one passenger, a South Port pilot who was scheduled to board an inbound vessel and bring it into port. After passing Stirling Point, the vessel turned too far to starboard, ran aground on rocks at a speed of about 18 to 20 knots.
The vessel sustained moderate damage to its hull and underwater fixtures. Two of the three people on board suffered minor injuries. There was no pollution. Coastguard later towed the vessel off the rocks and back to port.
TAIC’s Chief Investigator of Accidents, Louise Cook, says the master’s situational awareness was reduced by patchy fog and how they were operating the vessel.
“Speed and route choice reduced the time available to detect and correct course. The vessel’s electronic navigation systems were switched on and available to confirm the vessel’s position and progress, but the master wasn’t referring to them.”
“The master navigated mainly by visual references. The fog didn’t completely obscure the buoys and beacons marking the main channel, but it did reduce the reliability of the visual cues the master usually relied on.
“The key point is that safe navigation means choosing techniques that fit the conditions.
TAIC also found that South Port’s training and familiarisation arrangements for pilot boat masters lacked a formal process to periodically verify ongoing navigation proficiency.
Ms Cook said the accident reflects a wider risk that exists in many safety-critical operations.
“When people do a job every day in routine conditions and nothing bad happens, it’s easy for risky habits to become normal, but unusual conditions are where they’re tested.
“That’s why regular proficiency checks and the disciplined use of safety tools matter, even when things usually go well.
Following the accident, South Port reviewed its systems and has already made a series of changes. These include regular navigation competency assessments, updated operating procedures and passage plans, and refresher training in electronic navigation.
The Commission considers that those actions address the safety issue identified in its inquiry.
The lessons from the Bluff grounding are relevant to all operators of small, fast vessel in confined waters. Operating close to shore at speed in changeable visibility leaves very little margin for error. Using electronic navigation alongside visual navigation, and regularly checking proficiency, gives crews more time to recognise a problem and correct it before it becomes an accident.”