Executive summary
On Monday 10 February 2003, at about 1305, train control authorised northbound express freight Train 142 to depart Te Kauwhata and enter a single line section of track, into which an opposing hi-rail vehicle movement had been authorised about 30 minutes earlier, thereby creating the potential for a head-on collision.
The safety issues identified included:
· the training and certification of new entrant train controllers on additional train control desks soon after their initial certification
· the lack of a structured process for area familiarisation prior to certification on a train control desk
· the manning of the Auckland train control desk by unqualified staff
· the train controller not applying adequate safety measures to protect a hi-rail vehicle movement
· the train controller not using, nor being required to use, signal “blocking commands” as a defence against authorising a train to enter a section into which a hi-rail vehicle was authorised to enter.
The mandatory use of signal blocking commands, previously recommended by the Commission, has now been implemented.
One safety recommendation addressing the issue of supervision of train controllers in training was made to the operator.
Related Recommendations
Ensure that the supervision of on-the-job training of train controllers in training or trainee train controllers only be undertaken by qualified staff who have a current certification for that train control desk.