Train 935 & HRV 467, train authorised to enter track occupied by HRV, Ashburton, 21 November 2002
Status
Closed
Occurrence Date
Report Publication Date
Jurisdiction
NZ
Legacy Inquiry Number
02-128
On 29 August 2002, an incident occurred at Maimai when a locomotive engineer was authorised by train control to enter a section of track already occupied by a rail contractor. The locomotive engineer saw the contractor and stopped the train short of the work site.
On 21 November 2002, train control cleared a signal at Ashburton that authorised a train to enter a section of track that was already occupied by a hi-rail vehicle. Fortunately the driver of the hi-rail vehicle overheard the conversation between the train controller and the locomotive engineer and interrupted to advise that he was still in the section. The train did not enter the occupied section.
On 4 December 2002, an incident occurred near Lepperton when a locomotive engineer was issued with a track warrant by train control and given a signal to proceed into a section already occupied by a track gang replacing a broken rail. A collision was averted only because the track gang had cleared the track minutes before the train arrived.
Given the potential for each incident to have resulted in a collision and the similar issues arising from each incident, all 3 were combined into one report.
The safety issues identified included:
· the train controllers not following correct procedures for handling track user inquiries
· the lack of forward planning on the train control diagrams
· the train controllers’ lack of attention in ensuring the train control diagram was accurate and complete
· the issuing of a track warrant into a section of track that at the time was known to be occupied
· the hand-over process when the outgoing train controller completed his shift
· train controllers not using, nor being required to use, signal “blocking commands” to protect maintenance gangs and hi-rail vehicles
· the absence of an area familiarisation visit for the train controller prior to certification.
The Commission’s previous Occurrence Reports 00-101, 00-116 and 02-118 identified similar safety issues, and safety recommendations were made to the Managing Director of Tranz Rail to address the issues. Tranz Rail has now taken appropriate safety actions and no further safety recommendations have been made.
Report includes inquiry 02-129
On 21 November 2002, train control cleared a signal at Ashburton that authorised a train to enter a section of track that was already occupied by a hi-rail vehicle. Fortunately the driver of the hi-rail vehicle overheard the conversation between the train controller and the locomotive engineer and interrupted to advise that he was still in the section. The train did not enter the occupied section.
On 4 December 2002, an incident occurred near Lepperton when a locomotive engineer was issued with a track warrant by train control and given a signal to proceed into a section already occupied by a track gang replacing a broken rail. A collision was averted only because the track gang had cleared the track minutes before the train arrived.
Given the potential for each incident to have resulted in a collision and the similar issues arising from each incident, all 3 were combined into one report.
The safety issues identified included:
· the train controllers not following correct procedures for handling track user inquiries
· the lack of forward planning on the train control diagrams
· the train controllers’ lack of attention in ensuring the train control diagram was accurate and complete
· the issuing of a track warrant into a section of track that at the time was known to be occupied
· the hand-over process when the outgoing train controller completed his shift
· train controllers not using, nor being required to use, signal “blocking commands” to protect maintenance gangs and hi-rail vehicles
· the absence of an area familiarisation visit for the train controller prior to certification.
The Commission’s previous Occurrence Reports 00-101, 00-116 and 02-118 identified similar safety issues, and safety recommendations were made to the Managing Director of Tranz Rail to address the issues. Tranz Rail has now taken appropriate safety actions and no further safety recommendations have been made.
Report includes inquiry 02-129
Location
Ashburton (-43.903466,171.748722) [may be approximate]