Inquiries & Recommendations

Ngā ketuketutanga me ngā tūtohunga

At the conclusion of a brief local flight the pilot descended the helicopter over the Dart River. The helicopter collided with a pair of electric fence feeder wires, spanning a dry channel between the eastern bank and an adjacent island, and shortly afterwards struck the river bed. The pilot received fatal injuries but the passenger survived the accident.

On 21 August 2008 the Commission declared that this occurrence does not meet the test of section 13(1) (b) of the TAIC Act, and approved closing the investigation without publishing a report.

On Tuesday 18 January 2005, a track warrant control irregularity occurred at Woodville when a track warrant was issued to a locomotive engineer authorising his train to berth on the main line at Makotuku to cross an opposing train. The locomotive engineer of the opposing train was already in possession of a track warrant authorising his train to berth on the main line at Makotuku.

On Monday 16 February 2004 at about 0250 Train P40, a Palmerston North to Oringi return shunting service, derailed when it ran into a washout at the 43.554 km, between Oringi and Woodville on the Palmerston North – Gisborne Line. Six wagons derailed and about 150 m of track were damaged. Surface water from intense rainfall ponded upstream of culverts at 43.554 km and 43.581 km and washed out about 5 m of track formation. There were no injuries. The safety issue identified was the running of trains in adverse weather conditions after special track inspections had ceased.

[A preliminary investigation showed that the circumstances were not likely to have significant implications for transport safety. Consistent with section 13 of the TAIC Act the Commission discontinued the investigation and no report was published.]

[Investigated on behalf of the Government of Solomon Islands. Direct any inquiries for copy of the report to the Minister of Transport of that State]

On Thursday 7 June 2001 at about 2332, the passenger and freight ferry "Arahura", with 63 passengers and 68 crew on board, was approaching Wellington when a machinery space fire alarm that had been activated was being investigated. On opening the sliding watertight door to the machinery space the engineers were met by water pouring from the space at a height of about 1.6 m above the floor plates. The door was closed again and pumps started to pump the water overboard. Prior to the flooding being discovered the watchkeeping engineer had been pumping engine room bilges for some time.

On 25 October 1993 the southbound Auckland-Wellington passenger train No. 203 collided with the edge of an open door of a container on a northbound freight train, No. B38, which was stationary in a crossing loop at Whangamarino. A window in one of the carriages was broken injuring two passengers. The safety issue identified in this report is the minimum spacing between main lines and crossing loops.

[A preliminary investigation showed that the circumstances were not likely to have significant implications for transport safety. Consistent with section 13 of the TAIC Act the Commission discontinued the investigation and no report was published.]

[A preliminary investigation showed that the circumstances were not likely to have significant implications for transport safety. Consistent with section 13 of the TAIC Act the Commission discontinued the investigation and no report was published.]

On Wednesday 31 October 2001, at about 0800, Air National Chieftain ZK-RDT, operating as Origin 457, was on a scheduled passenger flight from New Plymouth to Auckland when the cabin door opened in flight. Passengers held the door in a slightly ajar position for about 10 minutes while the aeroplane was landed at Auckland. The incident resulted from wear and distortion of door latch components, which had not been detected and rectified.

On 28 March 2013, a Tranz Metro six-car Ganz Mavag electric multiple unit train was running an evening peak-hour passenger service from Wellington to Taita. The train was being driven by a trainee driver (trainee) undergoing on-the-job training. His performance was being monitored by a "minder driver", who was sitting across from and outside the driver's cab.