Inquiries & Recommendations

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On 25 June 2026, the Commission recommended that the chief executive of Lyttelton Port Company take reasonably practicable steps to verify that on-board systems with the potential to compromise dry dock safety are isolated and made safe prior to entering the dry dock, and that they maintain awareness of the status of these systems during the vessel’s time in the dry dock.

On 25 June 2026, the Commission recommended that the chief executive of Lyttelton Port Company modify its process and documentation to address how the overlapping responsibilities of parties conducting business in its dry dock are going to be managed.

6.3 On 25 June 2026, the Commission recommended that the managing director of Australian Longline PTY Limited review its safety management system and standard operating procedures to ensure it requires appropriate approval for proposed modifications to all safety-critical systems before conducting the work.

On 30 April 2026, the Commission recommended that the Chief Executive of KiwiRail Holdings Limited ensure that all structural-asset inspections and audit procedures are in full compliance with KiwiRail’s quality management system and standards, particularly with regard to riverbed-profile monitoring.

On 30 April 2026, the Commission recommended that the Chief Executive of KiwiRail Holdings Limited review the Trigger Action Response Plans for all high-risk assets to ensure they contain adequate responses to mitigate the risks specific to that asset.

On 30 April 2026, the Commission recommended that the Chief Executive of KiwiRail Holdings Limited develop and document KiwiRail’s risk-based asset management and maintenance system for flood and scour risk to rail bridges across the rail network.

On 24 March 2026, the Commission recommended that the chief executive of KiwiRail includes in KiwiRail’s train crew training risk-triggered commentary driving, and then ensures it is implemented in practice.

On 24 March 2026, the Commission recommended that the chief executive of KiwiRail review and improve KiwiRail’s training on the air-brake operation system and include the associated risks of not following the required procedures.

On 30 April 2023, the Commission recommended that Maritime New Zealand require KiwiRail to provide evidence to Maritime New Zealand’s satisfaction that safety-critical rubber expansion joints onboard all vessels within KiwiRail’s Interislander fleet are fit for purpose taking into account the manufacturer’s guidance, namely: • they should be no older than eight months from the date of manufacture when installed • they are inspected annually including visual, tactile and hardness measurements • regardless of inspection findings, safety-critical REJs should be replaced after five years.

On 30 April 2023, the Commission recommended that Maritime New Zealand alert all vessel operators using rubber expansion joints within a vessel’s safety-critical system to the importance of taking into account the date of manufacture, in addition to the time in service, in their maintenance schedules to ensure they are fit for purpose.

On 24 March 2026, the Commission recommended that the chief executive of KiwiRail takes action to put in place trackside information to assist train crews to respond appropriately to signals, monitoring the train’s speed and progress.

On 25 March 2026, the Commission recommended that KiwiRail review their emergency response planning, training, resourcing and risk mitigations to assure themselves they could effectively respond to a maritime emergency. The review should include examination of international conventions, resolutions and guidance that outline best practices.