Recommendation Date
Recipient Name
Shotover Jet
Text
Identify on each jet boat all components that are critical to the safe operation of the boat, and have a documented inspection and maintenance system in place that covers those critical components. The inspection and maintenance system should complement rather than replace any existing system of daily checks.
Reply Text
Safety recommendations 079/00, 081/00 and 082/00
The company has approached these matters in the following manner:
a. Of its own volition, immediately following the accidents involving Shotover 14 and 15, SJL as a matter of urgency internally identified those components that it considered were critical. The definition of “critical” was that the failure of them would have a high probability of leading to an incident or accident. These critical components were replaced during the fleet upgrade earlier in 2000 and identified with an installation date stamp. The total operational hours of each craft were noted at the time and the hours since are logged, enabling SJL to accurately record the operational hours of each component as well as the individual history of the component.
b. The second step in this process has been the contracting out to an independent, suitably qualified expert a detailed identification of all critical components and the assessment of a reasonable life expectancy of those components. These procedures are based largely on the aviation industry. Obviously the system provides for mandatory replacement or critical assessment once the nominated time limits are reached. A good example of this is the Hamilton 212 nozzle where this item was identified as critical. A limit of 500 hours was initially identified before crack testing took place but recent concerns have seen this limit lowered to 250 hours. On completion of the assessment process, all parts will be stamped with a unique identifier enabling lifetime tracing.
c. As noted earlier, SJL has rewritten its Safe Operating Plan and its workshop manuals. The systems of daily and other periodic inspections are noted in these documents.
The company has approached these matters in the following manner:
a. Of its own volition, immediately following the accidents involving Shotover 14 and 15, SJL as a matter of urgency internally identified those components that it considered were critical. The definition of “critical” was that the failure of them would have a high probability of leading to an incident or accident. These critical components were replaced during the fleet upgrade earlier in 2000 and identified with an installation date stamp. The total operational hours of each craft were noted at the time and the hours since are logged, enabling SJL to accurately record the operational hours of each component as well as the individual history of the component.
b. The second step in this process has been the contracting out to an independent, suitably qualified expert a detailed identification of all critical components and the assessment of a reasonable life expectancy of those components. These procedures are based largely on the aviation industry. Obviously the system provides for mandatory replacement or critical assessment once the nominated time limits are reached. A good example of this is the Hamilton 212 nozzle where this item was identified as critical. A limit of 500 hours was initially identified before crack testing took place but recent concerns have seen this limit lowered to 250 hours. On completion of the assessment process, all parts will be stamped with a unique identifier enabling lifetime tracing.
c. As noted earlier, SJL has rewritten its Safe Operating Plan and its workshop manuals. The systems of daily and other periodic inspections are noted in these documents.
Related Investigation(s)