Executive summary
On 13 December 1994 at 1717 hours, Train 901, the southbound "Southerner" express passenger service between Christchurch and Invercargill, was travelling at 94 km/hr when the Locomotive Engineer noticed a buckle in the track ahead. He was unable to bring the train to a halt in the space available, and although the locomotive and three passenger carriages remained on the rails, all wheels of the trailing vehicle, a luggage van, were derailed. Safety recommendations were made relating to the safety deficiencies identified which were the training and supervision of key track staff, the clarity of instructions to staff, and compliance with established standards for the formation and maintenance of continuous welded rail.
Related Recommendations
Undertake a review of the current safety management system relating to the installation, maintenance and operation of CWR track, and take appropriate steps to address those failings in the system which were identified as contributory to Edendale, prior to the 1995-96 summer season. As part of this review, particular attention should be paid to: • The adequacy of standards and procedures relating to the installation and maintenance of CWR track. • The compliance with standards and procedures relating to the installation and maintenance of CWR track.
Ensure systems are in place to assess the competency of any appointed or acting Track and Structure Manager or Ganger concerned to make such decisions.
Review the adequacy of existing Codes and procedures and amend as necessary to ensure they include unambiguous guidelines as to: • When, how, and where to measure rail temperatures. • A check list of conditions which identify clearly track which may be prone to buckling. • How to interpret the results of rail temperature measurements, and apply them to the immediate actions to be taken in respect of track which may be prone to buckling in order to ensure train safety when critical conditions are identified. • The follow-up actions to be taken to ensure on-going safety.
In light of the number of track buckles over the last two summer seasons, the LTSA should satisfy itself prior to the 1995/96 summer season that NZRL's safety system relating to CWR is sufficient and adequate.
Review the training, knowledge, and experience of Track and Structure Managers, Gangers, and those required to act in such positions, in respect of their ability to identify and understand the factors leading to track buckles and make timely and safe decisions about the application of speed restrictions in hot weather.