Executive summary
At about 0750 on 13 February 2001, the crew were performing a lifeboat launching drill shortly after the vessel "Nicolai Maersk" arrived in Auckland. While attempting to return the port lifeboat from the boat deck level to its stow position, the davit winch motor repeatedly tripped on overload. In order to stow the lifeboat, the davit arms were raised by manually closing the contactor located in the lifeboat winch starter box one deck below, to operate the winch motor. Manual closing of the contactor had the effect of bypassing the safety stop limit switches. The davit arms were pulled hard up to their stops and both wire falls parted. The lifeboat dropped to the boat deck and then rolled overboard, falling some 16 metres to the sea and landing upside down. Of the 7 crew inside the lifeboat, one was fatally injured, 2 were seriously injured and 4 received minor injuries.
Safety issues identified included:
• bypassing of critical safety features through the use of non-standard operating procedures
• the limited understanding the crew had of the lifeboat retrieval apparatus and its associated circuitry
• the fitness for purpose of the lifeboat retrieval apparatus and its approval by the various administrations involved
• the design oversight of a simple failsafe device on the lifeboat davit that could have prevented the lifeboat falling when the wire falls parted.
Safety recommendations were made to the operator, the manufacturer and the Director of the New Zealand Maritime Safety Authority to address the safety issues.
Related Recommendations
Liaise with the lifeboat davit manufacturer to establish the reason for limiting the winch capacity to the lifeboat plus 2 persons, and bring the installations on all company vessels fitted with them up to SOLAS compliance standards.
Submit a copy of report 01-203 to the Maritime Safety Committee of IMO to support the work and initiatives now being conducted by both the Marine Accident Investigation Branch and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency of the United Kingdom, regarding the safety of lifeboats and lifeboat drills. Any review conducted by IMO should consider reported accidents worldwide, with particular emphasis on lifeboat/rescue boat launch and recovery systems. In addition, the review should consider standardised and integrated systems which:
Circulate a memo to all company vessels describing the circumstances of this accident, and the lessons learned as outlined in this report.
critically review the design of the company’s survival craft launching apparatus and ensure that they: • can be readily understood by non-technical persons • will reliably perform tasks, which include lowering and deployment for training purposes • will perform safely under the control of operators with minimum experience and training • so far as is practicable, are failsafe • are accompanied by clear, unambiguous instructions in English.
Ensure the operating instructions for all survival craft and their launching appliances on all company vessels are correct, easily understandable by the crew, and clearly understood by the crew. Instructions should include a note not to deviate from standard operating procedures before fully assessing the consequences of doing so.