



MARINE OCCURRENCE REPORT

04-202

Restricted limit passenger vessel *Queenstown Princess*,
grounding, Lake Wakatipu

13 February 2004



TRANSPORT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION
NEW ZEALAND

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Report 04-202

Restricted limit passenger vessel *Queenstown Princess*

grounding

Lake Wakatipu

13 February 2004

Abstract

On Friday 13 February 2004 at about 2220, the restricted limit passenger vessel *Queenstown Princess* with 17 passengers and 2 crew on board grounded on the western side of the southern arm of Lake Wakatipu while returning from an evening cruise. Three passengers received minor injuries.

Because of the angle at which the boat came to rest, water entered the starboard hull through a cableway cut into the transom, flooding the engine compartment and disabling that engine. The passengers and the crewman climbed onto the shore to await rescue. The skipper refloated the boat and took it south to Collin's Bay, where he beached it.

Temporary repairs were made before the *Queenstown Princess* was escorted back to the Frankton Arm Marina under its own power.

Safety issues identified included:

- crew certification on restricted limit passenger vessels
- use of electronic navigational equipment in the safe navigation of the boat
- training for Local Launch Operator's certificate
- lack of navigational lights around Lake Wakatipu
- inability of Safe Ship Management and Maritime Safety Authority inspections and audits to ensure compliance with Maritime Rules.

Safety recommendations were made to the Chief Executive of Queenstown Lakes District Council, the owners of Queenstown Fishing Guides and Princess Cruises and the Director of Maritime Safety to address these issues.



The Queenstown Princess

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Abbreviations

MSA	Maritime Safety Authority
nm	nautical mile
SGS M&I	SGS M&I Safe Ship Management Company

Glossary

catamaran	twin-hulled boat
collision bulkhead	watertight transverse bulkhead close to the bow of a vessel to improve the watertight integrity in the case of a head-on collision
lee	the direction towards which the wind is blowing. The direction sheltered from the wind
sternleg	a propulsion system in which an inboard engine is coupled, through a boat's transom, to an outboard propeller shaft
surface drive	a propulsion system where the propeller shaft is level with the water surface with the propeller half in, and half out, of the water
transom	the aft side of the hull, usually on a square-sterned boat

Data Summary

Vessel Particulars:

Name:	<i>Queenstown Princess</i>
Type:	Restricted passenger
Built:	Nelson in 1993
Length	13.0 m
Beam:	4.64 m
Owner/operator:	Queenstown Fishing Guides and Princess Charters
Crew required:	1 Local Launch Operator
Number of passengers licensed to carry:	48
Engine/s:	2 x Caterpillar 3116 diesel engines manufactured in 1998
Propulsion:	2 x Seafury surface drives manufactured in 1998
Date and time:	13 February 2004 at 2220 ¹
Location:	Lake Wakatipu
Persons on board:	crew: 2 passengers: 17
Injuries:	crew: nil passengers: 3 minor
Damage:	Port hull holed in way of the collision bulkhead and flooded starboard engine compartment
Investigator-in-charge:	Captain Doug Monks

¹ Times in this report are New Zealand Daylight Time (UTC + 13 hours) and are expressed in the 24-hour mode.




Figure 1
Chart of Lake Wakatipu

1 Factual Information

1.1 Narrative

- 1.1.1 Shortly before 1900 on Friday 13 February 2004, guests started to arrive at Queenstown wharf in preparation for an evening cruise on Lake Wakatipu. The crew of the *Queenstown Princess* welcomed the passengers and prepared for the trip. At about 1910 the lines were let go and the skipper headed the boat out into Lake Wakatipu, before turning south towards the western side of the southern arm of the lake in order to benefit from the lee afforded from the westerly wind (see Figure 1).
- 1.1.2 At about 1925, when the boat arrived off the western shore, the skipper stopped the main engines and engaged the auxiliary outboard motors. This gave a speed of about 1 to 1.5 knots, which was suitable to troll for trout. The evening was spent trolling in Collins Bay and eating a barbeque meal prepared by the crew. At about 2200, it was decided to head back to Queenstown, so the fishing lines were brought in. The skipper started and engaged the main propulsion engines, and stopped the auxiliary motors before conning the boat up the western side of the lake towards Queenstown.
- 1.1.3 As they headed northwards, the skipper explained the operation of the radar to a group of passengers and talked to a number of others. The skipper estimated his speed to be about 6.5 knots, whereas the passengers thought it was about 2 knots faster.
- 1.1.4 At about 2215, the *Queenstown Princess* grounded, its port hull riding up on the rocky shore and slewing the boat round to port. It came to rest with the forward port hull elevated on a rock shelf (see Figures 2 and 3) and the starboard quarter deeper in the water. At the time of the grounding, 2 passengers on the afterdeck were propelled forward, lost their footing and crashed into the barbeque and ship's structure. Another passenger near the steering position was thrown forward into the console.




Figure 2
Grounding position with Queenstown in the background




Figure 3

Close-up of grounding position showing jagged rock that was narrowly missed

- 1.1.5 The skipper stopped both engines, and then he and the crewman inspected the damage. Using a cell phone, the skipper called the deputy harbourmaster, informing him of their situation and requesting an alternative boat be sent to take the passengers back to Queenstown. The passengers were asked to stay on the high, port, side of the boat to minimise the starboard heel. After about 10 minutes, water was noticed on the starboard side of the after deck. Lifejackets were issued to the passengers and the skipper decided that they should go ashore. They moved to the port bow and climbed down an aluminium ladder onto the rocky shore from where they climbed up a short rise and waited for rescue.
- 1.1.6 In order to prevent the progressive down-flooding of the starboard hull, the skipper decided to refloat the boat and bring it onto an even keel. The crewman stayed with the passengers on shore while the skipper started the port engine and put it astern to pull the boat off the rocks. The starboard engine could not be used as that space was flooded. The boat refloated and the skipper headed to Collins Bay, about 1.5 nm to the south, where he beached it on a shelving shingle beach.
- 1.1.7 At about 2315 the passengers and crewman were picked up by a boat belonging to Kawarau Jet and transferred to Queenstown, where they arrived at about 2330.
- 1.1.8 At about 2355, the harbourmaster and a team of 4 salvors attended the flooded boat at Collins Bay. They initially pumped the starboard hull and then assisted driving the lightened boat further up the beach, where it stayed for the remainder of the night. At daylight, a temporary patch was fitted over the hole in the port bow. Later, the harbourmaster escorted the boat back to Frankton Arm, where it was loaded onto its trailer and towed ashore. The boat was eventually taken by road to Dunedin for repair.

1.2 Damage and injuries

- 1.2.1 The boat grounded on a sloping rock shelf (see Figures 2 and 3) and its port hull was holed forward of and across the collision bulkhead (see Figures 4 and 5). The angle the boat assumed resulted in the starboard transom being submerged and water entering the starboard engine space through a hole that had been cut in the transom for the outboard motor control cables. An automatic submersible pump was unable to keep up with the ingress and the compartment was flooded. The flooding disabled the starboard engine and with it the main bilge pump, which was driven by that engine.
- 1.2.2 A boat builder in Dunedin repaired the port hull. The starboard engine was dismantled, dried and inspected; no corrosion was found in its internals.




Figure 4
Damage to port hull




Figure 5
Damage from the compartment abaft the collision bulkhead in port hull,

1.2.3 Three passengers suffered injuries. One woman on the afterdeck was momentarily knocked unconscious as she was thrown into the cabin superstructure, she also suffered bruising around her neck. A male passenger, also on the afterdeck, fell against the barbeque and fractured a rib. A third passenger, who was standing close to the steering position, was thrown into the console and had bruising to her arms and chest.

1.3 Weather and visibility

1.3.1 The wind on the evening of 13 February 2004 was westerly at about 10 knots and the sky was overcast. Sunset was at 2051 on 13 February and moonrise was at 0007 on 14 February. Consequently, there was little or no natural light at the time of the grounding.

1.3.2 While steaming, the lights in the forward part of the cabin were off but those in the after part remained on for passenger comfort and safety. The skipper said that this arrangement gave him fairly good visibility, but the instruments, echo sounder and radar did give backscatter and glare at the steering position, reducing the forward visibility.

1.3.3 Neither the skipper nor the passengers saw the shore before the boat grounded. Although once aground and stationary, there was sufficient light to see the shore.

1.4 Company and personnel information

1.4.1 In November 2002, the skipper, together with the crewman, bought Queenstown Fishing Guides and Princess Cruises as a going concern. The business owned 2 smaller boats in addition to the *Queenstown Princess*. The company's core business was to act as fishing guides to clients on lakes and waterways in the Queenstown area. They also ran charters on Lake Wakatipu.

1.4.2 The skipper of the *Queenstown Princess* had gone to sea in the British Merchant Navy as an electrician. He was a keen yachtsman and held Australian and British Yachtmaster's

certificates. He had worked throughout the world on various private yachts of between 60 and 120 foot in length. In June 1999, he had been issued with a Certificate of Competency (Deck Officer) Class 5 'Yachts only' by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency of the United Kingdom. This certificate expired on 31 January 2002 and had not been revalidated at the time of the accident.

- 1.4.3 The crewman had worked on a marine farm in 1992 and 1993. During that time he had been a construction diver, carried out maintenance and had been operator and crew on a maintenance barge. He had no maritime qualifications. He had completed the course for a Local Launch Operator's certificate but had not taken the examination.

1.5 Vessel details

- 1.5.1 The *Queenstown Princess* was a "Classico 35" catamaran built in Nelson in 1993. It was constructed of fibreglass over plywood and fitted with 2 Volvo KAD 44/DP engines with sternlegs². The boat was used exclusively on Lake Wakatipu for both charters and fishing cruises.
- 1.5.2 In 1998, the then owner decided to change the engines and propulsion systems in the boat and chose Caterpillar engines with Seafury SF26 surface-drive propellers. In order to accommodate the new engines and propulsion system, the engine compartment had to be lengthened. To do this the transom was cut off and about a metre of hull inserted before the transom was refitted. The refit was carried out at a boat yard in Dunedin.
- 1.5.3 The new engines and propulsion system gave the boat a minimum speed of between 6 and 7 knots, too fast to troll for trout, one of the principal uses of the boat. To operate at between 1 and 2 knots, the owner decided to install 2 Mercury 15 hp outboard motors that could be lifted clear of the water when not in use. Sliding brackets to house the motors were fitted at the time of the stern modification. On the boat's return to Queenstown the outboard motors were fitted and the remote control cables were run through the transom into the engine compartment and to the steering position. No watertight glands were fitted where the control cables passed through the boat's hull (see Figures 6 and 7).



Figure 6
Control cables passing through a hole in the transom

² A sternleg is a propulsion system in which an inboard engine is coupled, through a boat's transom, to an outboard propeller shaft.




Figure 7
Hole through the transom, from the starboard engine space

1.5.4 The boat was equipped with the following navigation equipment:

- Furuno FCV665 echo sounder
- Furuno 1721 radar (max range 16 nm)
- magnetic steering compass.

1.5.5 The boat was fitted with a bilge system that included a bilge/general service pump, driven off the starboard engine. There were also 4 submersible automatic electric bilge pumps, 2 in each hull, one in the engine room and one in the space immediately forward. The electric pumps were fitted with float switches but could be started manually. There were indicator lights and an audible warning at the steering position to indicate when the pumps were operating.

1.6 Navigation and lake topography

1.6.1 There were no navigational lights around the shores of Lake Wakatipu. The lake was generally deep and the shore steep-to. There were few isolated dangers offshore, the only one close to the area of operation of the *Queenstown Princess* on the evening of 13 February was Hidden Island off the northern coast of Cecil Peak (see Figure 1). There were no submerged dangers except in the shallows, very close to the shore.

1.6.2 There was a defunct private navigational light situated on the Cecil Peak headland about 200 metres north of the grounding position. It had been installed by Cecil Peak Station Tours to assist the safe passage of a ferry between Queenstown and the station landing in Collins Bay. The ferry service had stopped a number of years ago and the light had fallen into disrepair and been vandalised.

1.6.3 Generally, night navigation on the lake was conducted using dead reckoning, radar and echo sounder. Dead reckoning uses known courses, distances and speeds to calculate position and so maintain safe distances off the shore and known dangers. Such tracks are usually trialled in daylight to check that they had sufficient safety margins to allow for any discrepancies that may

occur at night. As the land is steep to, the water depth changes rapidly and so if the echo sounder is used, it has to be constantly checked for signs of a rising bottom. The steep shore gave a good radar target and would provide an experienced user with the most accurate positional data.

- 1.6.4 The skipper said that he was predominantly navigating by eye, using the lights of Queenstown and Frankton as reference points. On his return course he could see the lights of Queenstown ahead in the distance, some of which would have been visible over the headland into which he eventually ran (see Figures 1 and 2). He occasionally used the echo sounder to verify his position but had not referred to it for some minutes before the grounding. He indicated that the radar was on, but he was only using it to show the passengers how it operated; and he did not refer to it to check his position.
- 1.6.5 One of the passengers who had been shown the radar said that the heading marker was pointing at the headland. This was about 5 minutes before the grounding.
- 1.6.6 There was no official navigational chart for Lake Wakatipu. There was a 1 in 63 360 bathymetric chart, published in 1972 from data collected in 1968. This was not widely available and carried the following warnings
- Not to be used for navigation
- Nearshore features are not shown precisely on this scale
- 1.6.7 A hydrographic survey of Lake Wakatipu was completed in 2003 and Land Information New Zealand was compiling a navigational chart of the area, expected to be published in early 2005.

1.7 Safe Ship Management, surveys and audits

- 1.7.1 The *Queenstown Princess* was in Safe Ship Management with SGS M&I Safe Ship Management Company (SGS M&I). Replacement of the engines and lengthening of the boat was carried out under survey and to the Surveyor's satisfaction. Since the modifications, the boat had undergone 5 annual inspections by SGS M&I.
- 1.7.2 In addition to the Safe Ship Management Company surveys, the Maritime Safety Authority (MSA) had regularly inspected the boat. The last such inspection before the accident had been completed on 12 June 2003.
- 1.7.3 The Ship's Management Systems Procedures manual section 2.1 laid down the requirements for pre-trip checks. Included in that section was the requirement for a passenger safety briefing covering the operation of the boat, safety procedures, location and donning of lifejackets, restricted areas of the boat, emergency stations and procedures and any housekeeping matters.
- 1.7.4 The skipper and crewman said that they gave the passengers a full safety briefing. However the passengers' recollections were that they were welcomed aboard, told where the toilets were and to be careful on the steps to the flying bridge, but were not told of the location of the lifejackets and how to don them or the procedure to follow in an emergency.
- 1.7.5 During cruises it is inevitable that passengers will expect some form of intercourse with the skipper. How the skipper handles such communications and the level of distraction that he is able to manage need to be monitored carefully. The procedures manual did not address this safety sensitive issue.

1.8 Minimum manning, qualifications and course syllabus

- 1.8.1 Maritime Rules Part 31B Crewing and Watchkeeping Offshore, Coastal and Restricted (Non-Fishing Vessels) required the skipper of a vessel of less than 20 m, carrying less than 99 passengers, to have a Local Launch Operator's certificate endorsed for the area of operation (where more than 50 passengers were carried an extra crewman was required). The *Queenstown Princess* was less than 20 m and licensed to carry 48 passengers.
- 1.8.2 A Local Launch Operator's certificate was the minimum qualification required by a skipper of a passenger vessel. The certificate needed to be endorsed for a particular vessel and area of operation. The Director of Maritime Safety was able to endorse the certificate with a combination of vessels and areas up to a total of 6 endorsements.
- 1.8.3 The syllabus for Local Launch Operator's certificate did not include the practical use of radar. There was a theoretical section on the use of radar for collision avoidance. Inshore Launchmaster was the next higher qualification to the Local Launch Operator and was the first certificate that required practical knowledge of radar for which the candidate was required to sit a 4-day restricted radar course.
- 1.8.4 The MSA Principal Nautical Examiner indicated that the Class 5 "Yachts only" certificate held by the skipper was not equivalent to a Local Launch Operator. Holding the Class 5 "Yachts only" certificate would have exempted him from the nautical part of the Inshore Launchmaster's course. He would have had to take the engineering course and pass both the nautical and engineering examinations before being issued with that certificate..

2 Analysis

- 2.1 The *Queenstown Princess* grounded on the headland below Cecil Peak on the western side of the southern arm of Lake Wakatipu. The skipper was navigating primarily by eye and was heading directly towards the lights of Queenstown. He had the radar and echo sounder on but was not using them in an effective way to ascertain his position or maintain his course.
- 2.2 The lights of Queenstown would have been visible above the headland and may have led the skipper to believe that there was clear water ahead.
- 2.3 The syllabus for a Local Launch Operator's certificate did not require any practical training in the use of radar or other electronic navigational aids. This probably stems from the period where smaller vessels were not fitted with such equipment. Traditionally, these vessels were slow and heavily built, and so potentially less liable to major damage if they came into contact with the bottom or shore. However, modern boats are generally constructed of lighter materials, are faster and are better equipped with navigational equipment. The operators of such boats should be well trained in the use of electronic navigational aids.
- 2.4 The skipper, although very experienced in yachts, did not hold the correct certification for the operation of the *Queenstown Princess* and the certificate he did hold had lapsed. However, even if he had the Local Launch Operator's certificate his radar knowledge would not necessarily have been sufficient to avoid the grounding.
- 2.5 The MSA and the SGS M&I inspections and audits had not identified that the skipper did not hold the necessary qualification for the *Queenstown Princess*. Both the inspection report from the MSA and the Key Information sheet from the Safe Ship Management manual incorrectly showed that the skipper held a Local Launch Operator and Class 4 certificate. This would indicate that the skipper's certificates had not been sighted since he took over the company in November 2002.
- 2.6 This accident was the first of 2 groundings within 2 weeks (see TAIC occurrence report 04-204) that occurred at night on an enclosed limit passenger vessel fitted with radar. On each occasion,

the skipper had not been trained in the use of radar and consequently did not use it effectively to assist navigating the vessel.

- 2.7 The absence of navigational lights on Lake Wakatipu made navigating around the lake at night, without electronic navigational aids, difficult. As the tourist industry in the area continues to develop, the number of vessels using the lake at night will probably grow and the risk of grounding will increase. The marking of salient points on the lake would reduce the risk of another vessel grounding.
- 2.8 A previous operator, Cecil Peak Station Tours, had identified the headland as a potential grounding problem and a navigational light had been positioned there. Following the cessation of the ferry service between Cecil Peak Station and Queenstown, the light fell into disrepair. Had the light remained operational it would probably have warned the skipper that he was closing with the shore.
- 2.9 SGS M&I supervised the major alterations to the boat in 1998 but was unaware of the holes in the transom for the outboard motor control cables, which were drilled after the boat was returned to Queenstown. Subsequent inspections by MSA and SGS M&I should have identified the holes as liable to compromise the watertight integrity of the boat, but had not done so. Additionally, the then owner had a responsibility to inform SGS M&I of any major alterations carried out. The then owner complied with this in regard to the new engines and extension to the hull but neglected to advise SGS M&I that holes had been drilled in the transom.
- 2.10 At the time of the grounding, the skipper did not know where the water was entering the starboard hull, nor did he know the full extent of the damage to the port hull. However, he chose to refloat the boat in the hope that bringing it back onto an even keel would stop the flooding of the starboard hull without flooding the port hull. He was successful, and was able to beach the boat safely in Collins Bay. He did however risk his own safety and the boat foundering as it steamed south.
- 2.11 Beaching the boat in Collins Bay enabled the salvage team to pump it out and make temporary repairs and so prevented its total loss.
- 2.12 The skipper's decision to disembark the passengers was appropriate particularly having arranged for another boat to rescue them.
- 2.13 The passenger injuries were relatively minor and none needed hospitalisation, but the potential for a large number of casualties did exist had the boat foundered or hit the shore at a greater speed.
- 2.14 The safety briefing given to the passengers appears to have been insufficiently comprehensive and did not identify where the lifejackets were stowed. However, following the grounding the crew did manage the situation well, they called for assistance immediately, counted the passengers, distributed lifejackets and ensured the passengers got ashore before trying to refloat the boat.
- 2.15 On a boat with the steering position in the main cabin, it is inevitable that there will be some interaction between the skipper and the passengers. This will undoubtedly be distracting for the skipper, particularly so at night. On this occasion, the skipper seems to have become engrossed in conversation and had not noticed the shelving bottom on the sounder or the proximity of the land on the radar.
- 2.16 The weather did not contribute to the grounding other than persuading the skipper that the cruise should be along the western coast of the southern arm of the lake.
- 2.17 The salvage was well controlled by the harbourmaster and his team. The boat was returned to Frankton Arm and lifted from the water safely.

3 Findings

Findings and safety recommendations are listed in order of development and not in order of priority.

- 3.1 While returning from an evening cruise, the skipper of the *Queenstown Princess* became distracted or disorientated and grounded the boat on the headland of Cecil Peak Station close to the position of a discontinued light beacon.
- 3.2 The skipper prevented the continual down-flooding of the starboard hull by refloating the boat and bringing it back onto an even keel. He then beached the boat on a gently sloping shingle shore and so prevented the port hull flooding.
- 3.3 The skipper was heading directly for the lights of Queenstown without realising that his track was tangential to the headland.
- 3.4 The skipper did not effectively use the navigational equipment that was available to him, particularly the radar.
- 3.5 There were no navigational lights around the shore of Lake Wakatipu.
- 3.6 The skipper did not hold the correct qualifications for the operation of a passenger boat on Lake Wakatipu.
- 3.7 The syllabus for the minimum certificate required to operate a small passenger vessel in enclosed waters was better suited to slow, ill-equipped vessels of yesteryear. The skippers of modern vessels need to be trained so that they are able to operate them safely and efficiently.
- 3.8 The boat had been modified in 1998 and subsequently holes had been cut into its transom to run the outboard motor control cables. No attempt had been made to seal the holes, so when the starboard transom became submerged the hole on that side allowed the free ingress of water into the starboard engine space.
- 3.9 The then owner had not informed his Safe Ship Management Company that holes had been cut into the transom and they had gone unnoticed during subsequent inspections.
- 3.10 SGS M&I and MSA had not identified that the skipper did not hold the appropriate certification: in fact their reports erroneously identified that he did hold the correct certificates.
- 3.11 The safety briefing given to the passengers was not sufficiently comprehensive to make all the passengers aware of the procedures, should there be an emergency.

4 Safety Recommendations

- 4.1 On 15 July 2004 the Commission recommended to the Chief Executive Officer, Queenstown Lakes District Council that he:
 - 4.1.1 conduct a safety assessment on the benefits of establishing navigational light beacons on prominent points around Lake Wakatipu to assist the safe navigation of vessels at night. (033/04)
- 4.2 On 10 August 2004 the Queenstown Lakes District Council Harbourmaster replied in part:

The Council is currently compiling hazard ID data for lakes and rivers in this area. Lakes Wanaka/Hawea have been completed, Wakatipu is still to be completed. As part of this process we will be looking at where it may be beneficial to install nav aids in the future.

Funding for such things as beacons or any navigational aids must be included in the Council's Annual Plan process in which funding has already been set for the next two years, therefore we are limited as to what can be done for this period.

4.3 On 15 July 2004 the Commission recommended to the Owner of Queenstown Fishing Guides and Princess Cruises that he:

4.3.1 ensure that every vessel operated by the company has appropriately qualified crew in accordance with Maritime Rules Part 31B. (034/04)

4.3.2 develop a comprehensive standard passenger safety briefing to include the position of life saving apparatus, actions in the case of an emergency and identifying hazardous areas on the boat. (035/04)

4.4 On 5 August 2004 the owner of Queenstown Fishing Guides and Princess Cruises replied in part:

Recommendation 034/04 is in operation in accordance with the Maritime Rule 31B.

Recommendation 035/04 is in operation. Not much change from original briefs. Includes crew introduction, potential visible hazards, stowage of safety equipment and emergency procedures. All stowage areas are clearly marked as to their contents.

4.5 On 15 July 2004 the Commission recommended to the Director of Maritime Safety that he:

4.3.1 take steps to ensure that Maritime Safety Authority audits and inspections and Safe Ship Management inspections and surveys determine that vessels and their operations fully comply with the provisions of the Maritime Rules. (036/04)

4.3.2 develop the restricted radar course to include other forms of electronic navigational aids, such as global position systems and echo sounders. (037/04)

4.3.3 revise the syllabus for Local Launch Operator and other relevant marine qualifications to include a practical electronic navigation aid component similar to but shorter than the revised restricted radar course referred to in safety recommendation 037/04. (038/04)

4.3.4 conduct a cost benefit analysis into the requirement that applicants renewing their Local Launch Operator's certificate, who have not had practical electronic navigation aid training, should attend such a course before a new certificate is issued. (055/04)

4.6 On 25 July 2004 the Director of Maritime Safety replied in part:

036/04 The Maritime Safety Authority does not accept this recommendation as it is already taking positive steps to ensure that there is compliance by operators and their vessels to the provisions of the Maritime Rules.

As advised to the Commission in our letter of the 23rd July 2004, the Maritime Safety Authority has over the last 18 months developed with industry a Code of Practice for the delivery of Safe Ship Management Services which will detail the standards and delegations of SSM Companies, Surveyors, owners and Skippers.

This code will be reflected in Maritime Rule 21 when it is amended in the financial year 04/05. Considering these steps, and other initiatives the Maritime Safety Authority has taken to promote compliance, we consider this recommendation not warranted.

- 037/04 This recommendation is accepted dependant on the Maritime Safety Authority securing appropriate funding for policy and syllabus review for the proposed course from the Ministry of Transport in the financial year 05/06.
- 038/04 This recommendation is accepted dependant on the Maritime Safety Authority securing appropriate funding for policy and syllabus review for the proposed course from the Ministry of Transport in the financial year 05/06.
- 055/04 This recommendation is accepted dependant on the Maritime Safety Authority securing appropriate funding for the Cost Benefit Study and industry consultation for the proposed course from the Ministry of Transport in the financial year 05/06.

Approved on 30 July 2004 for publication

Hon W P Jeffries
Chief Commissioner



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