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Aviation Safety Recommendations

This page displays a list of safety recommendations that relate to the aviation mode.  You can use the filter tool to refine the results and to search for keywords within the text of each recommendation.

Urgent safety recommendations

Urgent safety recommendations released publicly in advance of a final report are available here until release of a final report at which time they are incorporated into the database.

 

 

Keywords: Recipient: Mode: Status:

Safety Recommendation 104/05
Issued To The New Piper Aircraft Inc on 22 Dec 05
Arrange for Piper Service Bulletin SB 893 "Nose Gear Centering Attach Bolt" to be amended, so that the instruction step 6?, which is to check for installation of placard p/n 582-943, is performed each time the SB is referred to.
Implementation Status: Open
Reply:

Safety Recommendation 038/05
Issued To Alpine Adventures on 31 May 05
include in the flight training programme for company helicopter pilots, slign load re-currency training as part their annual proficiency training programme.
Implementation Status: Open
Reply: Our company has included in the flight training program for the helicopter pilots the following:

Sling load re-currency training as part of the annual proficiency training.

Following the accident and on arrival of a new helicopter the pilot had a flight dedicated to sling load operations. This progressed well.

Safety Recommendation 063/05
Issued To Auckland International Airport on 13 May 05
examine runway visual indications with the objective of providing additional visual reminders to pilots that a displaced threshold is in operation.
Implementation Status: Open
Reply: Auckland International Airport Limited intends to implement the safety recommendation 063/05 and has already been looking for possible solutions. However, as there is no standard fix for this type of operation, it will not be something that can be implemented immediately. While we are unsure of the size of the task at this stage, it is likely to take at least 6 months, with perhaps a progressive roll out of different aspects in the interim.

Safety Recommendation 050/01
Issued To FlightLine Aviation on 17 Oct 01
establish a system to ensure proper monitoring and control of service bulletins.
Implementation Status: Open
Reply: There is no formal requirement to establish a system to ensure proper monitoring and control of service bulletins. Service Bulletins are produced by the manufacturer and after advice from the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (NZCAA), there is no mandatory requirement to satisfy overseas manufacturer's Service Bulletins for General Aviation aircraft unless they are reproduced as Airworthiness Directives.

Flightline Aviation does however - as a reputable and professional organisation obtain, view and generally advise customers of the existence of manufacturer?s Service Bulletins. Service Bulletins are received and assessed for applicability so that the customer has the option of accepting or rejecting their intent.

The issue has raised the point that there is general confusion within the aviation industry of whether, for example, a manufacturer?s Service Bulletin is actually mandatory within NZ and must be satisfied. Reference A relates to a conversation with the NZCAA and confirmation was obtained regarding the General Aviation requirements relating to Service Bulletins. In short, there is no requirement for NZ maintenance organisations to abide by manufacturer?s Service Bulletins (mandatory or otherwise) unless directed via a NZ Airworthiness Directive.

Reference B is the only direction that identifies aircraft types that have foreign source mandatory airworthiness requirements to be followed. The Rolls-Royce Allison 250-C20B engine is not included in this list.

Safety Recommendation 051/01
Issued To FlightLine Aviation on 17 Oct 01
Review Flightline's Rolls-Royce Allison 250-C20B engine trouble-shooting procedures, and ensure comprehensive fault diagnosis is carried out when a repeated component change does not rectify a known problem.
Implementation Status: Open
Reply: As stated within our submission to the report, all the relevant trouble-shooting procedures (and more) were carried out in accordance with the maintenance manual pertaining to the defect information supplied at the time.

Flightline Aviation's engineering staff are qualified and well experienced concerning this engine type. All documented trouble-shooting procedures were followed in accordance with the maintenance manual and it is only in hindsight with a complete set of facts that anyone could conclude that repeated component changes in this instance might not have been the best course of action. During the maintenance process the defect information changed regularly, and based on past experience, Flightline staff acted reasonably in light of the information on hand.

The intent of the safety recommendation refers specifically to this one engine type. ?Trouble-shooting procedures and comprehensive fault diagnosis for repeated component changes? relates not to only this one task but all trouble-shooting tasks. It is a generic requirement and Flightline cannot implement additional processes concerning one task over any other. As such we believe there is no necessity to implement this safety recommendation in addition to our current practices.

Safety Recommendation 056/99
Issued To CAA on 02 Nov 99
Initiate rule making to require information to be available and visible to passengers on air transport flights, such as on cards in seat pockets, that outlines the operating standards and how passengers can contact the operator or the CAA if they have any concerns about safety.
Implementation Status: Open
Reply: I adopt [this safety recommendation]. Due to the need to consider other rule-writing priorities and the need for extensive consultation, I am unable to specify a timeframe to complete the task.

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